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INTRODUCTION
Wilbur Leatherberry
MR. LEATHERBERRY: Thank you, Dan. On behalf of my faculty, col-
leagues, and the others in the Law School community, I welcome you to
Case Western Reserve University School of Law for this conference. I have
the privilege of introducing the panel for the Economic Impact of Canada-
United States Regulatory Convergence: From the Canada-United States Auto
Pact to the North American Free Trade Agreement and Beyond.
One of the things I remember about Henry is a fourth principle that Dan
did not mention, and that is that the conference should run on schedule. One
of my jobs is thus to try to keep us on schedule. I will not take too much
time, but I do want to introduce our two speakers.
Meera Fickling' is a research analyst from the Peterson Institute for Eco-
nomics in Washington, D.C. 2 She has been a research analyst since 2008.
Her areas of research include climate change and trade issues, particularly in
North America. She is co-authoring a book on the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA)3 and climate change policy to be published in
2010.
Maureen Irish4 is a professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of
Windsor, Ontario. She teaches international economic law, international
1 Biography: Meera Fickling, PETER G. PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L EcON.,
http://www.iie.com/staff/authorbio.cfm?author id=594 (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).
2 PETER G. PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON., http://www.iie.com (last visited Oct. 5,
2010).
3 JEFFREY J. SCHOTT & MEERA FICKLING, REViSITING THE NAFTA AGENDA ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, No. PB10-19 (2010), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pbl0-19.pdf.
4 Maureen Irish - Biography, U. WINDSOR, http://web4.uwindsor.callaw/irish (last visited
Oct. 5, 2010).
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business transactions, Canada-United States legal issues, and private intema-
tional law, what we would call our conflicts of law. She is the author of Cus-
toms Valuation in Canada,s and editor of The Auto Pact: Investment, Labour
and the WTO,6 and some other publications. She has served on dispute set-
tlement panels under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement7 and
NAFTA.
Without further ado, I will introduce Meera Fickling, who will be our first
speaker. We will reserve time at the end of this program for questions.
UNITED STATES SPEAKER
Meera Fickling*
MS. FICKLING: Thank you.
5 MAUREEN IRISH, CUSTOMS VALUATION IN CANADA (Don Mills ed., CCH Canadian Lim-
ited 1985).
6 THE AUTo PACT: INVESTMENT, LABOUR AND THE WTO (Maureen Irish ed., Kluwer Law
International 2004).
7 U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449,
102 Stat. 1851 (1988).
Meera Fickling has been a research analyst at the Peterson Institute since 2008 and
works with Senior Fellows Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott. Her areas of research
include climate change and trade issues, particularly in North America. She is co-authoring a
book on NAFTA and climate change policy to be published in 2010. Her prior work at the
Institute includes NAFTA and Climate Change: Legislate Nationally, Cooperate Regionally
(paper presented at the C.D. Howe Institute, October 2009) and Setting the NAFTA Agenda
on Climate Change (PIIE Policy Brief 09-18, August 2009). She graduated summa cum laude
from the College of William and Mary, where she majored in economics.
8 Meera Fickling submitted a paper in lieu of her remarks.
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FILLING THE LEGISLATIVE VACUUM: LOCAL, REGIONAL, AND
EPA CLIMATE CHANGE EFFORTS AND UNITED STATES-CANADA
INTEGRATION
By Meera Fickling*
Introduction
The December 2009 Copenhagen climate conference was not a high point
in the history of international negotiations, but many viewed the non-binding
commitments made there to be a step in the right direction.9 Both the United
States and Canada pledged a 17% reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions.'0 Along with international pressure, these commitments encouraged
other countries such as China, Brazil, and India to follow suit with limits on
the emissions intensity of their economies."
These commitments follow a long history of inaction, however, which has
proven difficult to reverse. The sharp recession in 2009 significantly reduced
carbon emissions,12 making targets set according to 1990 or 2005 levels easi-
er to meet. But the wrenching economic adjustments have conversely made
the task all the more difficult politically, and both United States and Canadi-
an governments have chosen not to enact economy-wide climate change reg-
ulation at this time.' 3
* This article draws heavily on the forthcoming book, NAFTA and Climate Change by
Meera Fickling and Jeffrey J. Schott, to be published by the Peterson Institute for International
Economics in early 2011.
9 TREVOR HOUSER, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L EcoN., POLICY BRIEF: COPENHAGEN, THE
ACCORD, AND THE WAY FORWARD (2010), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pbl0-05.pdf; Jennifer Morgan, Reflections from Copen-
hagen: The Accord and the Way Forward, WORLD RESOURCES INST. (Dec. 29, 2009),
http://www.wri.org/stories/2009/12/reflections-copenhagen-accord-and-way-forward.
10 Juliet Eilperin, U.S. pledges 17 percent emissions reduction by 2020, WASH. POST, Jan.
29, 2010, at A02; Press Release, Env't Can., Canada Lists Emissions Target under the Copen-
hagen Accord (Feb. 1, 2010) (on file with author), available at
http://www.ec.gc.caldefault.asp?lang-En&n=714D9AAE-I&news=EAF552A3-D287-4ACO-
ACB8-A6FEA697ACD6.
" HOUSER, supra note 9, at 1.
12 Energy-related GHG emissions fell by three percent in 2008 and seven percent in 2009.
See U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emissions in 2009: A Retrospective Review, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(May 5, 2010), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/environment/emissions/carbon/.
13 See Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhom, Democrats Call Off Climate Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 2010, at A15 ("Bowing to political reality, Senator Harry Reid ... said the Senate
would not take up legislation intended to reduce carbon emissions blamed as a cause of cli-
mate change," because, as he told reporters, "we don't have the votes."); see also Susan Dela-
43
3
Leatherberry et al.: Economic Impact of Canada-United States Regulatory Convergence: F
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2011
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAWJOURNAL
In the existing vacuum of legislative action, various states and provinces
have pursued their own climate change policieS.14 Federal regulatory agen-
cies in the United States may also play a role in the near future. Although
bilaterally coordinated, economy-wide climate legislation would be the best
policy for both countries, it seems the near-term goal will instead be to coor-
dinate this patchwork of policies in the absence of leadership from national
legislatures.
Why Have an Integrated Energy Policy?
Canada and the United States share a common environment and a long
history of environmental cooperation. The 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty
established the International Joint Commission as a forum for cooperation on
water issues, 1s and the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement estab-
lished common water quality responsibilities for the region.' 6 In addition,
the United States and Canada have signed acid rain and trans-boundary smog
agreements.17
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) region also has an
interdependent energy market. How energy is produced, used, and traded
has a large impact on GHG emissions and affects how each country can
adapt to a low-carbon future. The United States derives about a fifth of its
oil from Canada, 8 and in 2008 about two thirds of the crude oil produced in
Canada was shipped to the United States.' 9 While Canadian electricity does
not make up a large portion of most states' electricity portfolios, it does
court, Climate bill, Commons crushed in one blow, TORONTO STAR (Nov. 17,2010),
http://www.thestar.com/news/sciencetech/environment/article/892053--climate-bill-commons-
crushed-in-one-blow (Conservative senators killed climate-change bill passed by a majority of
elected MPs in the Commons, and Prime Minister Harper applauded the bill's defeat stating,
"[Bill C-3 11] set irresponsible targets and did not lay out any measure of achieving them,
other than by shutting down sections of the Canadian economy and throwing hundreds of
thousands and possibly millions of people out of work.").
14 RYAN WISER & GALEN BARBOSE, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L LAB., RENEWABLES
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS: A STATUS REPORT WITH DATA THROUGH 2007, at 3 (Apr. 2008),
available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/1bnl-1 54e.pdf.
1s Boundary Waters Treaty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448.
16 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, U.S.-Can., Apr. 15, 1978, 23 U.S.T. 301.
17 Agreement on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., Mar. 13, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 676 (containing provi-
sions to reduce acid rain); Protocol Amending the Agreement on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., Dec.
7, 2000, 2000 WL 33155943 (adding provisions to reduce transboundary smog emissions).
18 CARL EK & IAN FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL96397, CANADA-U.S.
RELATIONS 15 (Sept. 3, 2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/96-397.pdf [here-
inafter CUS RELATIONS REPORT].
19 See, e.g., GOVERNMENT OF ALBERTA, ALBERTA'S ENERGY INDUSTRY: AN OVERVIEW
2009, at 1 (2010), available at
http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/Org/pdfs/Alberta Energy Overview.pdf.
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comprise a major percentage of total consumption in a few border states.
Vermont obtains almost 40% of electricity consumed from Quebec,2 0 and
North Dakota and Minnesota obtain more than 10% of electricity consumed
from Manitoba.2 1
In addition, Canada is the largest supplier by far of energy-intensive man-
ufactures to the United States, including steel (20% of United States im-
ports), cement (53% of United States imports), paper (52% of United States
imports), and aluminum (55% of United States imports).22 In total, Canada
exported forty-four billion dollars of highly traded, energy-intensive products
to the United States in 2008.23 As a result, both countries are justifiably con-
cerned about maintaining a level North American playing field for energy-
intensive manufacturing.
Given the two countries' strong energy interdependence, decisions that af-
fect energy consumption in one jurisdiction will likely have spillover impacts
bilaterally. Consequently, the region has a strong interest in harmonizing
climate policies. Below, this paper lays out the policies on the table in the
United States and Canada, examines their implications for bilateral trade and
cooperation, and offers suggestions for coordinating these measures.
Canadian Policy
Canadian policy faces cross-cutting environmental and economic interests
pitting climate change objectives against the exploitation of natural re-
sources, especially oil sands. In both areas, Canadian officials are concerned
that their policies may create frictions with their NAFTA partners that could
affect regional trade and investment.24 Because Canada exports tens of bil-
lions of dollars of energy-intensive products to the United States, 25 it is high-
ly concerned about competitiveness impacts on these industries should it fail
20 JEFFREY J. SCHOTT & MEERA FICKLING, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON., POLICY BRIEF:
SET7ING THE NAFTA AGENDA ON CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (2009), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb09-18.pdf [hereinafter NAFTA AGENDA].
21 id
22 See JEFFREY J. SCHOTr & MEERA FICKLING, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON.,
REVISITING THE NAFTA AGENDA ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2 n.3 (2010), available at
http://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pblO-19.pdf; see also GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JISUN
KIM, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON., U.S. CLIMATE LEGISLATION IMPLICATIONS AND
PROSPECTS: CHALLENGES FOR CANADA 14 (2009) (stating that in 2008, U.S. imports of energy-
intensive manufactures from Canada totaled 47 billion U.S. dollars).
23 Based on products scheduled to receive allowance rebates under the Waxman-Markey
and Kerry-Lieberman bills. GARY HUFBAUER & JisuN KIM, CONFERENCE BD. OF CAN., U.S.
CLIMATE LEGISLATION IMPLICATIONS AND PROSPECTS: CHALLENGES FOR CANADA 14 (Nov.
2009).
24 See generally id. at 12-14, 17-19.
25 See id. at Table 2.
45
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to synchronize its policies with the United States. As a result, Canada has
remained paralyzed on climate change, deferring action on the issue until the
United States decides on its own policy course.26
In the interim, Canada is slowly moving away from its previous climate
change plan, Turning the Corner.2 7 In its January 2010 Copenhagen submis-
sion, Canada pledged to reduce emissions 17% below 2005 levels by 2020-
in contrast to Turning the Corner's 20% by 2020 target-in line with the
United States' Copenhagen promise and United States legislation currently
on the table.28 Canada further qualified its submission as "to be aligned with
the final economy-wide emissions target of the United States in enacted leg-
islation." 2 9 Thus, the likelihood that Canada will act ahead of the United
States is slim.
However, there is an additional variable in the Harper Administration's
climate policy calculus: Bill C-31 1, a piece of legislation that passed the
House of Commons in May 2010 and awaits a vote in the Senate as of the
writing of this paper.30 The Bill requires the Administration to develop a
plan to reduce emissions by 25% below 1990 levels by 2020, or approxi-
mately 40% below 2005 levels.31 If the Bill passes the Senate-an outcome
that is far from guaranteed, seeing as an identical bill failed in the Senate in
20083 2 -Canada's current approach to climate change will clearly require
significant revamping, although the Administration may strike a deal with the
opposition in order to lower the targets. Even if the Bill does not pass, how-
ever, a close vote displaying political support for action on climate change
could cause the Canadian government to re-think its wait-and-see approach.
26 Id. at 13.
27 See GOv'T OF CAN., TURNING THE CORNER: TAKING ACTION To FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE
(2008), available at http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/virage-comer/2008-03/pdfl572 eng.pdf.
28 Compare id. at 2 and Letter from Michael Martin, Chief Negotiator & Ambassador for
Climate Change, to Yvo de Boer, Exec. Sec'y United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, (Jan. 29, 2010), available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/application/pdf/canadacphaccordappl.pdf (including "Cana-
da's submission of its qualified economy-wide emissions target for 2020") [hereinafter Co-
penhagen Letter).
29 Copenhagen Letter, supra note 28, at Appendix I.
30 An Act to ensure Canada assumes responsibilities in preventing dangerous climate
change, C-311, 40th Parliament (2nd Sess. 2009).
31 id
32 Bill C-377 was the predecessor to Bill C-3 11. See Status ofthe Bill:C-377, LEGISINFO,
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Sites/LOP/LEGISINFO/index.asp?Language=E&Chamber-N&StartLi
st-A&EndList-Z&Session=14&Type=O&Scope=I&query=4868&List-stat (last visited Jan.
1, 2011). See also Gloria Galloway, Tory senators kill climate bill passed by House, GLOBE &
MAIL (Nov. 17, 2010, 10:56 AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-
notebook/tory-senators-kill-climate-bill-passed-by-house/articlel802519! (stating that the
Senate voted against Bill C-31 I on Nov. 16, 2010).
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United States Policy
To date, the United States climate policy has largely been pursued by in-
dividual states, many following precedents of performance standards set by
California. 3 Thirty states adopted a renewable portfolio standard,3 4 and sev-
enteen states committed to adopting automobile emissions standards that
would produce fuel economy improvements in excess of federal regulation.3 5
Many states also implemented energy efficiency measures. 36
With the entrance of the Obama administration, this dynamic appeared to
have changed. The administration has directed the National Highway Trans-
portation Safety Authority to raise fuel economy standards to California lev-
els 37 and issued an endangerment finding for carbon dioxide. 38 Most im-
portantly, a cap-and-trade bill, the American Clean Energy and Security Act
(ACES), passed the House of Representatives, 3 9 and a similar bill, the Amer-
ican Power Act, was introduced in the Senate.40
Since then, however, the United States has failed to pass meaningful leg-
islation at the federal level. The Senate progressively watered down climate
change proposals, until Majority Leader Harry Reid finally announced on
July 22, 2010 that no comprehensive measure to address climate change
would be addressed before the August recess-not even a renewable portfo-
lio standard, which many had expected would be brought to the floor.41 With
the death of comprehensive climate change legislation in the Senate, United
States climate policy for the near future turns to the states and to the EPA,
both of which have led thus far.42 Below, this paper details state and provin-
cial initiatives on the table and examines their implications for Canada-
United States integration. Next, the paper examines some hypothetical ac-
tions the EPA could take to reduce carbon emissions.
State and Provincial Legislation
States are developing and implementing several programs that may not be
passed at the national level in the near term, including caps on industry and
3 NAFTA AGENDA, supra note 20, at 3.
34 id
35 Id
36 id
37 Id. at 4.
38 id
3 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 11Ith Cong. (2009)
[hereinafter ACES].
4 Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111 th Cong. (2009).
41 See Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call OffEffort For Climate Bill in
Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010, at Al5.
42 See generally NAFTA AGENDA, supra note 20.
47
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transportation emissions, renewable portfolio standards, and low-carbon fuel
standards. If lawmakers are able to put into action all of the state initiatives
currently on the table, coverage of these programs will be extended to the
greater part of the United States, including the industry-heavy Midwest.
These initiatives could be significant-PointCarbon estimates that the RGGI
and a scaled-down WCI could meet up to 41% of the United States' Copen-
hagen target and a quarter of Canada's Copenhagen target.43 Another study
by the World Resources Institute shows that state programs combined with
EPA regulation could reduce emissions 12% below 2005 levels by 2020."
Below, this paper explains some of these policies in detail.
Cap-and-Trade
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is the only multi-state
cap-and-trade system with mandatory emissions caps currently in force in the
United States.45 Members include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and
Vermont.4 6 The program initially covers only electric power generators-
about 95% of the electricity sector falls under the cap-and-trade regime-but
coverage may expand later to other sectors such as transportation. 4 7 The goal
of the cap-and-trade system is to stabilize emissions from 2009 to 2014 and
reduce emissions by 2.5% per year between 2015 and 2018, for a total de-
cline in emissions of 10% by 2018.48
The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) is an agreement among California,
Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington, British Columbia, Manitoba,
Quebec, and Ontario to reduce emissions 15% below 2005 levels by 2020.49
Unlike the RGGI, the WCI envisions an economy-wide cap by 2015 .5o Cali-
43 CARBON MARKET RESEARCH NORTH AMERICA, PLAN B - GOING IT ALONE: REGIONAL
PROGRAMS IN NORTH AMERICA (2010), available at
http://www.pointcarbon.com/research/cmana/cmana/1.1416963.
4 NICHOLAS M. BIANCO & FRANZ T. LITZ, WORLD RESOURCES INST., REDUCING
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES USING EXISTING FEDERAL AUTHORITIES
AND STATE ACTION 3 (2010), available at
http://pdf.wri.org/reducingghgsusing existing federal authorities andstate action.pdf.
45 REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, INC., FACT SHEET, available at
httg://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGI FactSheet.pdf.
Id.
47 id
48 id
49 WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WCI REGIONAL
CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM 15, app. C, p. 1 (2008).
50 id
48 [Vol. 36, No. 1]
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fornia has led states on implementation, publishing a draft regulation under
Assembly Bill 32 in 2009.
However, other states including Oregon, Washington, and Montana are
unlikely to be able to implement a cap-and-trade program by the WCI start
deadline of 2012.52 The New Mexico environmental department, faced with
opposition in the state legislature, is attempting to formulate resolutions un-
der existing state law. Even California's law is subject to a ballot measure
in November 2010 that could suspend it until unemployment reaches 5.5%-
which is not likely to happen in the near future.54 Republican gubernatorial
candidate Meg Whitman also supports postponing implementation until
2013.ss
Despite these possible setbacks, the WCI is likely to have a far larger ge-
ographic scope than the RGGI. Whereas the RGGI trading program is con-
fined to the northeastern part of the United States, with Canadian observers,
the WCI trading system involves both U.S. states and Canadian provinces,
with Mexican observers.56 Further, the WCI allows carbon offsets to come
from anywhere in North America, whereas RGGI offsets must come from
within the RGGI region.57
Renewable Portfolio Standards
The most common local measure implemented in North America, the re-
newable portfolio standard, is a requirement that covered utilities supply a
certain percentage of electricity from renewable sources. As of 2007, 31%
of United States retail electricity sales were covered by a mandatory renewa-
ble standard. 59  Although the renewable energy requirement is the most
common measure discussed in this paper, measures differ widely across the
continent. The most obvious area of divergence is the target percentage of
renewable energy to be achieved by a certain date; arguably the least strin-
s1 Press Release, Office of the Governor of California, Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Land-
mark Legislation to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Sept. 27, 2006).
52 NAFTA AGENDA, supra note 20, at 6.
sa Id
54 id
55 Id
5 REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, supra note 45; WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE,
supra note 49.
5 See generally REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, supra note 45 and WESTERN
CLIMATE INITIATIVE, supra note 49; see also NAFTA AGENDA, supra note 20, at 6.
58 States with Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. DEPARTMENT ENERGY
http://appsl.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewableportfolio states.cfm (last updated June
16, 2009).
5 WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 14, at 5.
49
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gent target, belonging to Texas, is 5% by 2015, whereas California's target is
33% by 2020.60
Other areas of divergence, however, are significant for North American
cooperation. In particular, rules regarding eligibility of various sources of
electricity, recognition of other states' renewable electricity, and recognition
of other states' renewable electricity credits (RECs) vary widely across the
61
continent. Varying definitions of renewable energy limit the fungibility of
renewable energy markets, as renewable electricity certified in one state
might not be able to be sold to another state in order to comply with the se-
cond state's standard.62 Despite definitions of renewable energy that differ
from state to state, many state laws do not clarify which out-of-state RECs
can be used to count toward RPS compliance and which cannot. In addi-
tion, the systems that certify and manage renewable electricity credits are
highly regionalized. 4
Fuel Standards
Executive Order S-01-07 instructs the California Air Resources Board to
develop and implement a low carbon fuel standard (LCFS) that reduces the
average carbon intensity of passenger vehicle fuels by 10% between 2010
and 2020.65 The standard must be in place by 2010.66 In order to comply,
firms may blend or sell an increasing amount of low-carbon fuels or purchase
credits from fuel providers that have exceeded the standard. 7 Finns may
also bank credits for use at a later date.68 A set of draft regulations requiring
source-to-wheel life-cycle analysis to determine GHG content was released
in October 2008,69 and revisions were released in January 2009.70 Because
6 Id. at 3-4.
61 See generally id.
62 Id. at 26.
63 EDWARD A. HOLT & RYAN H. WISER, ERNST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L
LAB., THE TREATMENT OF RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES, EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES, AND
GREEN POWER PROGRAMS IN STATE RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 10-12 (2007), avail-
able at http://eetd.1bl.gov/ea/emp/reports/62574.pdf.
6 Id. at 4.
65 Cal. Exec. Order No. S-01-07 (Jan. 18, 2007).
6 Id.
67 id.
68 id.
69 CAL. AIR RESOURCES BD., PRELIMINARY DRAFT STAFF PROPOSAL: RECOMMENDED
APPROACHES FOR SETTING INTERIM SIGNIFICANT THRESHOLDS FOR GREENHOUSE GASSES
UNDER THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT (2008), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/localgov/ceqa/meetings/1 02708/prelimdraftproposal 102408.pdf.
70 BRENT D. YACOBUCCI & KELSI BRACMORT, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, R40460,
CALCULATION OF LIFE CYCLE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FOR THE RENEWABLE FUEL
STANDARD 2 (2010), available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/10Apr/R40460.pdf.
50o [Vol. 3 6, No. I ]
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the regulations ratchet down allowable average GHG content starting in
2011, new technologies must be implemented immediately in order to meet
the standard.
Although California is the only state currently implementing an LCFS,71
Ontario, British Columbia, and the RGGI region have committed to adopting
the standard, 7 2 and others have shown interest in joining them.73 WCI mem-
bers including Oregon, Washington, Arizona, and New Mexico are consider-
ing adopting an LCFS,74 and the Midwest Accord steering committee has
discussed incorporating one into its program. If widely adopted, the LCFS
could constrain imports from Canadian oil sands and encourage greater pro-
duction of sugarcane, soy, and cellulosic ethanol and biodiesel. President
Obama has called for a national LCFS,76 but the provision was dropped from
the American Clean Energy and Security Act.7 7
71 DAVID CRANE & BRIAN PRUSNEK, THE ROLE OF A Low CARBON FUEL STANDARD IN
REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND PROTECTING OUR ECONOMY (2007), available at
httj://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/fact-sheet/5155/.
Eleven States to Adopt Calfornia's Low Carbon Fuel Standard, ENVTL. LEADER (Jan. 4,
2010), http://www.environmentalleader.com/2010/01/04/11 -states-to-adopt-californias-low-
carbon-fuel-standard/.
7 CRANE & PRUSNEK, supra note 71.
74 Oregon Low Carbon Fuel Standard, PEW CENTER,
http://www.pewclimate.org/node/6869 (last vistied Jan. 6, 2011) ("On July 22, 2009, Oregon
Governor Ted Kulongowski signed into law H.B. 2186, which allows the Oregon Environ-
mental Quality Commission (EQC) to adopt ... a low carbon fuel standard, which would
require a reduction in fuel carbon intensity of ten percent from 2010 levels by 2020."); Low
Carbon Fuel Standards, DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, STATE OF WASH.,
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/climatechange/fuelstandards.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2011) ("In May
2009, Governor Christine Gregoire issued Executive Order (E.O.) 09-05 Washington's Lead-
ership on Climate Change . .. which directs the Washington Department of Ecology . . . to
assess whether the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) or a modification thereof
would best meet Washington's greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets."); Arizona, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/state/tracking/individual/az.html (last visited Jan. 6,
2011) ("HB 2776 (introduced February 2008) would provide conditional authority to the Ari-
zona Department of Environmental Quality to adopt rules regarding low carbon fuel stand-
ards."); Stephen P. Holland et. al., Greenhouse Gas Reductions Under Low Carbon Fuel
Standards?, I AM. EcoN. J., 106, 107 n.4 (2009), available at
http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/pol. 1.1.106 (stating that many states have pro-
posed adopting low carbon fuel standards including New Mexico).
7 Low Carbon Fuel Policy, MIDWESTERN GOVERNORS Ass'N (2010),
http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/lcfs.htm.
76 Press Release, White House: Office of the Press Sec'y, President Obama Announces
Steps to Support Sustainable Energy Options, Departments of Agriculture and Energy, Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency to Lead Efforts (May 5, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/President-Obama-Announces-Steps-to-Support-
Sustainable-Energy-Options/.
77 See generally American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 11 Ith Cong. (1st
Sess. Mar. 31, 2009).
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Implications for North American Trade and Cooperation
Carbon Market Integration
State and provincial cap-and-trade programs are by nature bilateral. The
RGGI contains several Canadian observers, including Quebec, Ontario, and
the Eastern Canadian Provinces, that could potentially join the program later
on.78 Four Canadian provinces are scheduled to participate in the WCI-
British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec-and Saskatchewan is an
observer.79
The WCI is open to participation from any North American jurisdiction,
in one of several capacities.80 Any jurisdiction may join the Initiative so long
as it adopts the same emissions reduction commitments-15% by 2020.81
The WCI also permits allowances from other cap-and-trade programs to be
sold within the region, although the combined total of outside allowances and
offsets is restricted to no more than 49% of emissions reductions.82 The
standards for sale of outside emissions allowances to the WCI are as yet un-
clear.
Although the RGGI limits offsets to those produced within the RGGI re-
gion, WCI offsets may come from anywhere within North America and
may comprise up to 49% of emissions reductions.8 4 The WCI design rec-
ommendations require WCI partners to set stringent standards for monitor-
ing, reporting, and verifying offsets.85
Renewable Electricity Trade
86Canada derives about 60% of its electricity from hydropower, some of
which may be sold to the United States to meet renewable electricity pro-
78 Timothy P. Duane, Greening the Grid: Implementing Climate Change Policy Through
Energy Efficiency, Renewable Porfolio Standards, and Strategic Transmission System In-
vestments, 34 VT. L. REV. 711,732 (2010).
79 WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, supra note 49.
80 Id. at 13.
81 id.
82 Id. at 10.
83 REvISITING THE NAFTA AGENDA, supra note 22, at 6; see also CO2 Offsets, REGIONAL
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/market/offsets (last visited Jan. 6, 2011)
("At this time, the RGGI participating states limit the award of offset allowances to five pro-
ject categories, each of which is designed to reduce or sequester emissions of carbon dioxide
(C0 2), methane (CH4), or sulfur hexafluoride (SF 6) within the 10-state region.") (emphasis
added).
8 WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, supra note 49, at 10.
85 Id. at 43.
86 REVISITING THE NAFTA AGENDA, supra note 22, at 8.
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curement goals.87 In addition to direct transmission, many states allow utili-
ties to buy tradable renewable energy credits (RECs) for renewable electrici-
ty generated outside the state, even if the electricity itself is not actually de-
livered to the state, although RECs must be certified by various regional
tracking systems.
Hydropower transmitted from Canada can also help United States border
states meet renewable portfolio standard requirements.89 In order for hydro-
power to qualify as renewable electricity under any of the various statutes,
however, it must meet standards for capacity, additionality, and environmen-
tal quality. 90 In verifying compliance with these standards, inclusion of Ca-
nadian hydropower as a qualifying renewable source poses regulatory diffi-
culties.
Most border states exclude large hydropower from qualifying as renewa-
ble electricity, a point that is highly contentious among United States and
Canadian governments.91 Hydro Quebec has been a vocal advocate for in-
cluding large-scale hydropower in state standards, arguing in New York State
discussions9 2 and preparing a submission to the NAFTA Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (CEC).9 3 Manitoba Hydro and the state of Min-
nesota have also clashed over the definition of hydropower in state stand-
ards.94
Many states, however, allow small hydropower and other renewable re-
sources generated out of state to qualify under their renewable standards.
These include major buyers of Canadian electricity such as California, Min-
nesota, and New York. 95 Usually, in order to qualify, either the electricity
must be delivered into the state, or the renewable electricity credits (RECs)
corresponding to the electricity must be registered with the regional tracking
system corresponding to the state. 9 6 Due to the high volume of electricity
transmission between Canada and key border states-approximately 7% of
the electricity generated in Canada is sold to the United States-state renew-
87 Id
88 id
89 Id
90 Id
9' Id at 9.
92 id
93 Id
94 Id.; Ian H. Rowlands, Renewable Electricity Policies across Borders, in CHANGING
CLIMATES IN NORTH AMERICAN POLITICS 187 (Hendrik Selin & Stacy D. VanDeveer, eds.,
2009).
9 See Lynn M. Fountain, Johnny-Come-Lately: Practical Considerations ofa National
RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1475, 1482 (2010); U.S. ENVrTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENERGY
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS AND THE PROMOTION OF COMBINED HEAT AND POWER 4-6 (2009),
available at http://www.epa.gov/chp/documents/eps andjpromotion.pdf.
96 Fountain, supra note 95, at n.29-30.
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able portfolio standards constitute a significant opportunity for Canada to
develop and export additional clean energy.97
Fuel Standards
Canada is the leading supplier of oil to the United States market: United
States imports of Canadian crude oil and refined products in 2008 totaled 2.5
million barrels per day (mmb/d) out of a total Canadian production of 3.4
million bbl/d.9 8 Oil sands production accounted for about half of Canada's
total crude oil and almost two thirds of Alberta's crude oil production,99 and
over 95% of Canada's oil reserves are in the oil sands of Alberta.'00
The LCFS will constrain oil sands imports into jurisdictions that adopt
it.1o' Oil sands production generates 15-20% more GHG emissions on a
well-to-wheel basis than conventional oil.102 This puts it at a disadvantage to
conventional oil and other fuels under the standard, particularly as the cost of
producing from the oil sands is already relatively expensive compared to
"conventional" crudes.o 3  Oil sands operations could lower their carbon
footprint to that of conventional fuels by using carbon capture and storage
technology, but the technology has not been yet developed at commercial
scale and could prove to be an expensive option. 10 4
9 See generally CAN. ELECTRICITY Ass'N, THE INTEGRATED ELECTRICITY SYSTEM:
SUSTAINABLE ELECTRICITY AS THE FOUNDATION FOR EcoNOMIC RECOVERY IN NORTH AMERICA
10 (2010), available at
http://www.electricity.calmedialpdfs/economic/canada us affairs/CEA Enhancing_2010_fina
1.pdf (showing energy exports and imports between Canada and the United States).
98 Canada, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 2009),
htt://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/canada/Oil.html.
Id.; see also Gov'T OF ALTA., ALBERTA OIL SANDS INDUSTRY 2 (2010), available at
http://www.albertacanada.com/documents/AOSIDQuarterlyUpdateSpring20l0.pdf (indicat-
ing that 170 billion of Alberta's 179 billion barrels of oil have the special quality of being
bitumen, i.e., oil sands oil).
100 Canada, supra note 98.
"o1 See J. Scott Childs, Continental Cap-and-Trade: Canada, the United States, and Cli-
mate Change Partnership in North America, 32 Hous. J. INT'L L. 393,438 (2010) (indicating
oil sands oil industry is significantly impacted by Low-Carbon Fuel Standards).
102 MICHAEL TOMAN ET. AL., RAND CORP., UNCONVENTIONAL FOSSIL-BASED FUELS:
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE-OFFS 27 (2008), available at
htt://www.rand.org/pubs/technical-reports/2008/RAND TR580.pdf.
Childs, supra note 101, at 406; James Bixby, The 2005 Energy Policy Act: Lesson on
Getting Alternative Fuels to the Pump in Minnesota, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 353, 354 n.8
(2008) (indicating oil sands oil is expensive to produce).
104 See Childs, supra note 101, at 410 (indicating that, while Carbon Capture and Sequestra-
tion may prove to be a good solution in the future, it has yet to be used on wide-scale basis and
continues to be very expensive).
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Currently, the Midwestern (PADD II) region of the United States pur-
chases 75% of the unconventional crude exported from Canada.'o Only a
small percentage goes to California and other states that have committed to
the LCFS.106 As a result, the LCFS at this time is unlikely to have a signifi-
cant deterrent effect on oil sands production, although this could change if
the standard is adopted by Midwestern, Rocky Mountain, or Gulf Coast
states.
Possibilities for EPA Regulation
A week after the Senate abandoned hope of passing climate change legis-
lation in 2010, the EPA issued a report affirming that greenhouse gases
threatened human health and welfare, declaring in a press release that "cli-
mate science is credible, compelling and growing stronger."l 07 The Supreme
Court ruled in 2007 that the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to regulate pol-
lutants that they find endanger human health and welfare. 08
Shortly afterward, the EPA issued a proposed regulation requiring large
new emissions sources and capacity additions to existing sources to obtain
permits under its New Source Review program.109 The permits will require
these emitters to adopt the best available emissions control technologies
105 MARC HUMPHRIES, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, RL34258, NORTH AMERICAN OIL SANDS:
HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT, PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 19 (2007), available at
http://www.au.af.mil/aulawc/awcgate/crs/rl3425 8.pdf; see also NAT'L ENERGY BD., CANADA'S
ENERGY FUTURE: INFRASTRUCTURE CHANGES AND CHALLENGES TO 2020, at 10 (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-
nsi/rnrgynfntn/nrgyrprt/nrgyftr/2009/nfrstrctrchngchllng201 0/nfrstrctrchngchllng20l 0-
eng.pdf ("The U.S. Midwest (PADD II) is Canada's largest market for crude oil, followed by
the Rocky Mountain region (PADD IV), the U.S. northeast (PADD I), the U.S. west coast
(PADD V) and the U.S. Gulf Coast (PADD III).").
106 See Mike DeSouza, Climate plan spares oilsands, Baird told California policies in line
with Canadian goals, MONTREAL GAZETTE (Dec. 6, 2010),
http://www.montrealgazette.com/business/Climate+plan+spares+oilsands+Baird+told/393245
2/story.html ("The LCFS is expected to have a negligible impact on the Canadian oil industry,
as Canadian crude oil imports account for less than two per cent of California's crude oil
imports . . . ."); see also MOREY BURNHAM, EARTHWORKS, TRACKING TAR SANDS CRUDES
RESEARCH NOTE 1: CANADIAN CRUDE OIL IMPORTS TO U.S. REFINERIES, 5, 10-11 (2010),
available at http://earthworksaction.org/pubs/GulfCoastRefineries ResearchNote l.pdf (indi-
cating California imports only nine million barrels of oil sands oil and that the majority of
California refineries do no import oil sands oil).
107 Press Release, Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Rejects Claims of Flawed Cli-
mate Science (July 29, 2010) (on file with author).
10 Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
109 ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PROPOSED RULES ON CLEAN AIR ACT PERMITS FOR
SOURCES OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS UNDER THE PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT
DETERIORATION PROGRAM: FACT SHEET 1-2 (2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/NSR/documents/20100810SIPFlPFactSheet.pdf.
55
15
Leatherberry et al.: Economic Impact of Canada-United States Regulatory Convergence: F
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2011
CANADA-UNITED STATES LA WJOURNAL
(BACTs).11o The EPA has not yet defined what the best available technolo-
gies for greenhouse gas reduction are."'
The World Resources Institute has published a report detailing three dif-
ferent potential EPA regulation scenarios: "Lackluster," "Middle-of-the-
road," and "Go-Getter."I 12 Possible regulations for manufacturing and power
plants include efficiency and emissions requirements for power plants."
The "go-getter" scenario also includes the implementation of a cap-and-trade
program under the Clean Air Act to achieve the reductions expected under
proposed federal regulation.1 14 The report suggests tighter appliance effi-
ciency standards, as well as CAFE standards of fifty miles per gallon by
2030 in the "middle-of-the-road" scenario and sixty-three miles per gallon in
the "go-getter" scenario. 1 5
Whereas it is technically feasible for the federal government to implement
the "go-getter" regulations described above, Congressional politics could
constrain the executive branch's ability to act. In June, Congress rejected a
resolution sponsored by Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) that would have
preempted the EPA from regulating greenhouse gases at all," 6 and a similar
proposal by Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) to delay EPA action for two years
is expected to be blocked for now. 17 Legal challenges are still in the prelim-
inary stage, and their outcomes are uncertain.
For now, the EPA has room to deal with climate change. A Republican
Congress, however, would be likely to block EPA regulation under the Clean
Air Act, particularly if its actions too closely approximate the scale or meth-
ods of the cap-and-trade bills that the party leadership has successfully de-
monized."' Most of the actions suggested by the WRI would have been
110 Id. at 4.
11 See generally id.
112 BIANCO & LITZ, supra note 44, at 1.
"' Id. atl10-11.
114 Id. at 11, 18-19.
"' Id at 28-30, 32.
116 A joint resolution disapproving a rule submitted by the Environmental Protection Agen-
cy relating to the endangerment finding and the cause or contribute findings for greenhouse
gases under section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, S.J. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2010); see also
156 Cong. Rec. S4836 (daily ed. June 10, 2010) (vote to reject resolution).
117 Whereas the Murkowski amendment would prevent the EPA from regulating green-
house gases, the Rockefeller amendment is limited to stationary sources. See The Stationary
Source Regulations Delay Act, S. 3072, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter Rockefeller Amend-
ment].
118 See generally Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Teary, Busy, Ugly Lame Duck Congress, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 18, 2010, at WK1 ("Senator Mike Johanns, a Nebraska Republican, sought earlier
this year to bar a lame-duck Congress from creating the energy emissions exchange known as
cap and trade-favored by Democrats but anathema to Republicans-but his plan never got a
vote.").
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preempted by the Rockefeller proposal, and many require the EPA to set up a
cap-and-trade program on its own."19
Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to expect the "lackluster" actions and
some of the "middle-of-the-road" and "go-getter" actions to be implemented.
Since vehicle fuel economy standards have historically fallen under the pur-
view of the executive branch, it could be feasible for the EPA and Depart-
ment of Transportation to adopt "middle-of-the-road" or "go-getter" vehicle
standards, and strong appliance standards also might not be overly controver-
sial. However, for power plants-the largest emissions source by far l2-it is
difficult to see the EPA adopting a go-getter approach.
Regulation via the executive branch sidesteps many of the international
coordination issues inherent to market-based policies. Unlike Congress, the
Environmental Protection Agency is unlikely to allow polluters to avoid
commitments by purchasing offsets from abroad. Because utility pollution
will likely be regulated through emissions standards rather than through a
market-based renewable portfolio standard, issues regarding definitions of
"renewable" are moot at the federal level.
Being on a smaller scale-and being controlled by the executive branch,
which is less beholden to localized constituencies than the legislative
branch-EPA regulation is unlikely to carry with it the same kinds of com-
petitiveness provisions that were central to the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-
Lieberman bills. Importers of goods and services will not have to purchase
international allowances at the border. Likewise, the special treatment for
trade-intensive manufacturing industries that had been included in the cap-
and-trade bills attempted by Congressl 2 ' is less likely to appear within com-
mand-and-control regulation.
On the surface, it would thus seem that Canadians have less to worry
about in terms of disruption of international trade under EPA regulation than
under a cap-and-trade bill. 122 However, they will also miss out on significant
benefits that market-based mechanisms would have provided. 123 If Canada
chooses to fulfill its Copenhagen commitment, the task of reducing emissions
119 Compare BIANCO & LITZ, supra note 44, with Rockefeller Amendment, supra note 117.
120 BIANCO & LITZ, supra note 44, at 4-5, 10.
12 See, e.g., S. 280, 110th Cong. (2010); S. 309, 110th Cong. (2010); S. 317, 110th Cong.
(2010); S. 485, 110th Cong. (2010); S. 3036, 110th Cong. (2010); S. 2191, 110th Cong.
(2010); H.R. 620, 110th Cong. (2010); H.R. 1590, 110th Cong. (2010); H.R. 4226, 110th
Cong. (2010); H.R. 6186, 110th Cong. (2010); H.R. 6316, 110th Cong. (2010).
122 Though the border measures proposed in the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman
bills caused much consternation among United States trading partners, it is highly unlikely that
Canada would have been subject to them. See NAFTA AGENDA, supra note 20, at 7.
123 HUFBAUER & KIM, supra note 22, at 2, 12.
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will become much more difficult and expensive without the option of trading
allowances with the United States.124
This is because it will likely cost more for Canada to reduce GHG emis-
sions reductions than the United States. The United States Energy Infor-
mation Administration (EIA) projects that Canada's carbon dioxide emis-
sions will grow at 0.8% per year between 2006 and 2030, under business as
usual conditions.12 5 In contrast, United States emissions are projected to
grow by only 0.3% per year.12 6 Canada is also projected to have the highest
carbon dioxide intensity among the OECD countries in 2030 under business
as usual: 359 metric tons per million dollars of GDP.12 7 U.S. carbon dioxide
intensity in 2030 is projected to be 282 metric tons per million dollars of
GDP. 12 8 The difference in projected GHG emissions growth is largely due to
the projected growth of emissions from Alberta's oil sands.129
In order to achieve the same percent change in greenhouse gas emissions
as the United States, Canada would need to make greater reductions from
business as usual levels. Bramley, Partington, and Sawyer estimate that ab-
sent allowance trading, the cost of emissions allowances in Canada will be
twice as much as in the United States to achieve the same quantity of carbon
emissions reductions. 30 Allowance trading with the United States would
alleviate these cost pressures by lowering allowance prices to United States
levels.13 1
Canada also loses the increased export market for its hydropower that a
federal renewable portfolio standard would provide. Under the Waxman-
Markey bill passed by the United States House of Representatives, United
States utilities would likely have had the option of subtracting imported Ca-
nadian hydropower from their baseline generation amounts, against which
compliance with the renewable standard would have been judged.132 Canadi-
an hydropower might also have counted as renewable itself, although certifi-
cation issues would likely need to be worked out with the United States gov-
124 MATTHEW BRAMLEY ET. AL., PEMBINA INST., CLEAN ENERGY AND CLIMATE ACTION: A
NORTH AMERICAN COLLABORATION 12 (2009), available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/linkingnat cap north america.pdf ("Canada is very unlikely to
meet its current national GHG target for 2020 under this outcome, because its carbon price
would be lowered to the U.S. level, without any compensating import of allowances.").
125 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 112 (2009), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/0484%282009%29.pdf [hereinafter ENERGY OUTLOOK
2009].
126 d
127 Id. at 114
128 id
129 BRAMLEY ET. AL., supra note 124.
130 Id. at 17.
131 Id
132 ACES, supra note 39.
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ernment. Both options to expand the market for its hydropower will be lost if
the United States does not adopt a federal market-based renewable portfolio
standard.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
Unfortunately, all but the most cursory climate change legislation appears
to be stalled at the federal level in the United States and Canada. This might
be perceived as a boon by some who are worried about the effect of these
policies on certain narrow industries or on international trade relations more
broadly. However, comprehensive, broad-based, and intelligently coordinat-
ed policies could have lowered the cost of reducing emissions in both coun-
tries. Instead, we are left with EPA regulation under a law that was not de-
signed to deal with greenhouse gas emissions, and a patchwork of state and
provincial laws. While these programs are a step forward on climate change,
they are insufficient to comply with international commitments, much less
reduce GHG concentrations to 450 parts per million, and they are a less effi-
cient means of accomplishing these goals.
Nevertheless, this paper offers some modest steps that the two countries
could take to coordinate these state and federal initiatives. The Commission
for Environmental Cooperation, a body created by NAFTA's environmental
side agreement, has already committed to improving the comparability of
North American greenhouse gas emissions data.'33 With modest budgetary
increments, it could play a significant role in NAFTA climate change initia-
tives by expanding its database on North American emissions and reporting
on new climate initiatives and regulations in each country. By so doing, the
CEC could assist in the monitoring, reporting, and verification of carbon
credits issued under national or regional carbon regimes, which could lower
transaction costs of offset projects among the three North American coun-
tries.
Somewhat more controversially, states and provinces may work toward
coordinated renewable electricity policies. All parties should agree on how
imported electricity should be credited and certified under renewable portfo-
lio standards, both at the federal and state levels. To the extent feasible,
states and provinces should harmonize definitions of renewable electricity in
order to stimulate development by increasing the fungibility of RECs. Har-
monization and expansion of renewable energy credit tracking systems could
also widen the geographic area from which renewable credits could be pur-
chased.
133 Mapping North American Environmental Issues, CEC,
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PagelD=l 225&ContentlD=&SiteNodelD=586&BL ExpandID=
(last visited Jan. 7, 2011).
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States and provinces are already discussing the possibility of mutual
recognition of carbon credits generated by various regional cap-and-trade
schemes,134 and they should continue to study options for coordinating or
integrating these evolving carbon regimes. Policy coordination could facili-
tate carbon credit trading by ensuring that carbon credits in all jurisdictions
represent similar kinds of carbon reductions. In addition, greater coordina-
tion among carbon trading regimes could help address concerns regarding
"carbon leakage" that have plagued the implementation of cap-and-trade
programs in many states.135
The North American countries should shield climate change taxes and
regulations from claims under the indirect takings provisions of NAFTA
Chapter 11. Chapter 11 requires governments to provide compensation to
investors for measures that are "tantamount to expropriation." 3 6 To date,
Chapter 11 cases have assumed a limited scope for environmental laws con-
stituting expropriation. 3 7 Climate change laws will most likely have much
broader economic effects than prior environmental legislation, and the scope
of potential claims under NAFTA Chapter 11 due to climate change laws and
regulations could be orders of magnitude greater than those filed in the past.
The potential for such Chapter 11 litigation against climate change laws
could slow the implementation of measures designed to mitigate GHG emis-
sions and adversely flows of trade and investment in the region.
These measures would increase the efficiency of state and regional cli-
mate change regulations. However, they are no substitute for a comprehen-
sive national approach to climate change in both countries. In order to en-
sure the best policy outcome, Obama and Harper should work toward a na-
tional cap-and-trade or carbon tax bill.
134 See MATrHEW BRAMLEY ET. AL., supra note 124, at 9-10 (describing various regional
carbon-trading systems, which include both provincial and state members).
1 See id. at 7 (arguing that the states and provinces have a greater interest in linking than
national governments because carbon leakage could be greater, when measured relative to
total jurisdictional emissions, between neighboring states or provinces than between neighbor-
in5 countries).
North American Free Trade Agreement U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. I110(1), Dec. 17, 1992,
107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
137 Alberto R. Salazar, NAFTA Chapter 11, Regulatory Expropriation, and Domestic Coun-
ter-Advertising Law, 27 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 31, 40 ("the concept of 'a measure tanta-
mount to expropriation' as set out in Article 1110 of NAFTA has been defined conservatively
by recent tribunal decisions.").
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CANADIAN SPEAKER
Maureen Irish'
MS. IRISH: Good morning, everyone. It is a pleasure to be here. I have
to say that, along with many other people here, we really miss Henry. I am
glad to see the bell is there, and I am going to watch and make sure that I
stop before I get the bell.
I am going to speak about regulatory convergence and the accompanying
legal framework. Unfortunately, what I am arguing is that there are some
issues in the legal framework that create problems as regulatory convergence
is pursued. I am suggesting that regulatory convergence is very difficult
when we do not have a convergence of governments.138
First, I will speak about issues related to vocabulary. Then I will speak
about what I believe to be a mutual recognition agreement that is already
present in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),1 39 and then
I am going to talk about the potential legal problems flowing from most fa-
vored nation (MFN) rights in the World Trade Organization (WTO).
First, concerning vocabulary, there are three approaches to consider: na-
tional treatment, harmonization, and recognition of equivalence. National
treatment is the easiest one to apply: there is nothing to coordinate between
governments. Imported goods simply meet the standards in the country of
import, the host country, and simply need to receive treatment at least as fa-
vorable as that of domestically-produced goods. 14 0 That is very easy.
Harmonization of standards, however, is difficult to do. You have to ne-
gotiate, and it takes a lot to come to a uniform standard.
The recognition standard, recognition of equivalence, also requires ongo-
ing coordination and negotiation. The imported goods do not have to meet
the standards in the country of import, the host country, because the stand-
ards in the country of production or export are recognized as equivalent to
Dr. Maureen Irish teaches international economic law, international business transac-
tions, Canada-United States legal issues, and private international law (conflicts). She is the
author of Customs Valuation in Canada (1985), as well as editor or co-editor of The Auto
Pact: Investment, Labour and the WTO (2004), International Trade & Intellectual Property:
The Search for a Balanced System (1994), and The Legal Framework for Canada-United
States Trade (1987). Dr. Irish has served on dispute settlement panels under the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement.
138 See generally Maureen Irish, Regulatory Convergence, Security and Global Administra-
tive Law in Canada-United States Trade, 12 J. Int'l Econ. L. 333 (2009).
' NAFTA, supra note 136.
140 Id. art. 301.
61
21
Leatherberry et al.: Economic Impact of Canada-United States Regulatory Convergence: F
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2011
CANADA-UNITED STATES LA WJOURNAL
those standards. The home country standards are thus recognized as equiva-
lent and, therefore, the imports can circulate freely in the country of import.
I am going to be talking about what I see as a framework of an existing
mutual recognition agreement in NAFTA, and I will talk about the sanitary
and phytosanitary (SPS) chapterl41 and the technical barriers to trade (TBT)
chapter. 14 2 I will then move to similar provisions in the WTO. SPS provi-
sions apply to standards having to do with the life and health of plants and
animals, including humans. TBT applies to all other standards-related
measures concerning goods.
In NAFTA, we already have significant encouragement for harmoniza-
tion. First, in the SPS chapter, "(e)ach Party should . .. consider relevant ...
measures of the other Parties" when it is developing its own SPS stand-
ards.14 3 In the TBT chapter, "the Parties shall, to the greatest extent practica-
ble, make compatible their respective standards-related measures." 14 It is
qualified, but the word there is "shall." In the definition section, Article 915,
"make compatible" includes bringing standards-related measures "to a level
such that they are either identical" (which would be harmonization) "equiva-
lent or have the effect of permitting goods . .. to be used in place of one an-
other or fulfill the same purpose." 4 5 "Make compatible" therefore includes
harmonization and some recognition of equivalence. Within NAFTA, we
already have this obligation towards harmonization.
We also have a significant obligation concerning equivalence in the SPS
chapter. "Each importing Party ... shall treat" an SPS measure of another
NAFTA Party "as equivalent to its own" if the exporting Party demonstrates
that the measure "achieves the importing Party's appropriate level of protec-
tion." 46 That is also a "shall" in this provision. The importing Party can
refuse to recognize equivalence on a scientific basis. If it does so, on request,
it shall provide written reasons.14 7 Thus there is already an equivalence pro-
vision in NAFTA concerning SPS.
The same thing applies in the TBT chapter with respect to technical regu-
lations. A technical regulation is a standard that is obligatory. 14 8 If the par-
ticular measure is not of mandatory obligation, then we just call it a standard.
141 Id. ch.7, sec. B.
142 Id. ch. 9.
143 Id. art. 7 14(4).
144 Id. art. 906(2).
145 Id. art. 915.
146 Id. art. 714(2).
147 d
148 Id. art. 915 (defining a technical regulation as "a document which lays down goods
characteristics or their related processes and production methods, or services characteristics or
their related operating methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which
compliance is mandatory.").
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But a technical regulation is something that applies to goods in a mandatory
way. In the TBT chapter, "(e)ach importing Party shall treat a technical
regulation" of the exporting Party as equivalent if the exporting Party, once
again, demonstrates that that technical regulation "adequately fulfills the
importing Party's legitimate objectives."1 4 9 The importing Party can refuse
to recognize equivalence. But, once again, if it does so, on request, it must
provide written reasons. 5 0 Thus there is already, in NAFTA, I think, the
framework for an existing mutual recognition agreement (MRA).
I am moving now to the comparable position in the WTO in the SPS
agreement, and the TBT agreement at the WTO.
The provision concerning the SPS agreement at the WTO is actually fair-
ly comparable to the NAFTA provision. In the SPS agreement, a Member
"shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other Members as
equivalent ... if the exporting Member objectively demonstrates ... that its
measures achieve the importing Member's appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection." 5 1  The main difference here between this and
NAFTA is that we do not have the same procedural rights. Nothing says that
if the importing Member refuses to recognize, then, on request, it must give
written reasons. Nevertheless, the active word in Article 4.1 is "shall." This
is an obligation. There is, as well, within the SPS agreement a tendency to-
wards the encouragement of MRAs: "Members shall, upon request, enter into
consultations with the aim of achieving bilateral and multilateral agreements
on recognition of the equivalence of specified sanitary or phytosanitary
measures."1 52 This may be very specific rather than an overall MRA.
The rights concerning the TBT agreement at the WTO are significantly
weaker. This agreement applies to all other standards. Concerning TBT,
Members simply need to give positive consideration to accepting a technical
regulation as equivalent, provided they are satisfied that it fulfills the objec-
tives of their regulations.1 53 Accordingly, this is weaker than the NAFTA
obligation to recognize. The TBT agreement contains, however, encourage-
ment toward the development of MRAs: "Members . . . are encouraged to
149 Id. art. 906(4).
150 Id. art. 906(5).
' Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 4.1, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1867
U.N.T.S. 493.
' Id. art. 4.2 ("Members shall, upon request, enter into consultations with the aim of
achieving bilateral and multilateral agreements on recognition of the equivalence of specified
sanitary or phytosanitary measures.").
1 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 2.7, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493.
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enter, upon request, into consultations" for the development of such agree-
ments.'54
Now, I am moving to the legal question I will raise. It is a bit of a chal-
lenge. My question has to do with the standard obligation in trade law of
Most Favored Nation ("MFN") treatment. GATT Article I says that "[a]ny
advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity granted ... to any product originat-
ing in" one country "shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to
the like product originating in" any of the other WTO Member countries. 55
Now, what does this mean concerning an MRA? The right for an import to
circulate freely in the country of import without meeting the domestic stand-
ards there, surely has to be within the phrase "an advantage, favor, privilege,
or immunity." Surely there has to be something here that will come from
having an MFN right. The question, really, is what exactly has to be accord-
ed immediately or unconditionally to the products of other WTO members?
What exactly is required in this MFN right?
Joel Trachtman, writing in the Journal of International Economic Law in
2003,56 said that if a country failed to recognize a home country regulation
that meets the goals of the importing country, then that would be de facto
discrimination. He is assuming, I think, in the context of the article, the
standard of the Cassis de Dijon decision in the European Community con-
cerning a provision in the Treaty of Rome on measures equivalent to quanti-
tative restrictions.157 According to my interpretation of the Cassis de Dijon
principle, any product lawfully produced or marketed in one member of the
Community must have free access to other member countries of the Commu-
nity unless it would harm legitimate interests in the importing state, such as
public health or consumer protection. 15' Now, if that is the overriding prin-
ciple, then MFN is a significant obligation.
154 Id art. 10.7.
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
156 Joel P. Trachtman, Toward Open Recognition? Standardization and Regional Integra-
tion Under Article XXIVof GA IT, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 459, 463 (2003).
157 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fir Branntwein, 1979
E.C.R. 649 (1979).
158 Rend Joliet, The Free Circulation of Goods: the Keck and Mithouard Decision and the
New Directions in the Case Law, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 435, 438 (1995) ("Nevertheless, [mem-
ber states] are not allowed to apply their legislation to goods legally produced and sold in
other Member States, and therefore in compliance with different criteria, unless this is neces-
sary to satisfy mandatory requirements relating to the efficiency of the tax system, protection
of public health, fairness in commercial transactions, or consumer protection."); see also
Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and GA TT/WTO:
State Power, Interests, and the Structure ofRegime Solutions 24 (Berkley Roundtable on Int'l
Econ., Working Paper No. 75, 1995), available at
http://brie.berkeley.edu/publications/WP%2075.pdf.
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The idea that MFN would carry that much weight means that it would be
difficult to negotiate a closed mutual recognition agreement. In fact, this
means that any MRA should be seen as possibly open to other countries,
provided their goods would not harm legitimate interests in the importing
country, as Lorand Bartels argues in the Journal of International Economic
Law in an article published in 2005."9
There is thus significant scholarly discussion here to say that the MFN re-
quirement has a fair bit of weight.
I cannot provide a rdsum6 of all of the discussion, but I will mention four
possibilities about what the MFN obligation might involve. The first one,
which I have already talked about, is the Cassis de Dijon standard: goods
being able to circulate lawfully in the importing country unless they harm
legitimate interests there.
In a second possible approach, we might say that goods would be able to
benefit from MFN treatment if there is a demonstration that the regulation in
the exporting country meets the particular goals of the importing country.
This is, I believe, the NAFTA standard that we just saw in the SPS and TBT
provisions of NAFTA. That is possibly another way of looking at the MFN
obligation.
In a third possible interpretation, we might say instead that the MFN obli-
gation would come into play if the regulation of the exporting country is sub-
stantially the same as the regulation of the importing country. Here, I am not
just looking at whether something actually meets the goal, but whether the
regulation itself is substantially the same. It is not just, is the lumber strong?,
but rather Is the lumber thick enough? Does the lumber have too many knots
in it? In other words, does the regulation use the same regulating factor.
This looks at things not just in terms of performance, but rather the design or
descriptive characteristics of the standard. That is a third possibility.6 o
If we use that third approach, there is jurisprudence to say that an MFN
obligation could come into play. In 1981, Canada won a General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) panel decision against the European Economic
Community (ECC) because of Article 1.161 The ECC was failing to recognize
standards for beef. Canada argued that the ECC was accepting two United
States standards, Prime and Choice, as indicating quality of the beef (because
cattle had been fed for 100 days on high energy food, etc.) although the ECC
had not accepted Canadian standards that Canada said provided the same
159 See generally Lorand Bartels, The Legality of the EC Mutual Recognition Clause under
WTO Law, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 691 (2005).
160 See generally Report of the Panel, European Economic Community -Imports ofBeef
from Canada Recourse to Article XX7II: 2 By Canada, L/5099 (Mar. 10, 198 1), GATT
B.I.S.D. (28th Supp.) at 92 (1981).
161 Id.
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kind of assurance. At the time, the United States was accepting those Cana-
dian standards as meeting the requirements for United States Prime or United
States Choice goods. The United States was accepting those standards, but
the ECC was not. The standards were substantially the same, and Canada
won the GATT dispute. It was held by the panel that the ECC was in fact
breaching Canada's MFN rights. We thus have one GATT panel decision
confirming the operation of MFN on that interpretation for recognition of
standards.
There is a fourth question about what would be involved in according the
same right immediately and unconditionally as a right granted to other WTO
Member in an MRA. If there is a regulation presented for recognition, does
the exporting country have to offer mutual recognition itself? If the export-
ing country is saying that its standards should be accepted under MFN rights
because the importing country is party to an MRA, could the importing coun-
try say that its standards must be recognized as well? In other words, could
the importing country impose a reciprocal obligation of mutual recognition
on the exporting country? Lorand Bartels, in the journal article I mentioned
earlier, says that the importing country cannot make this demand because
MFN treatment is to be accorded unconditionally. 6 3 I have some concerns
about that interpretation; I think it would turn the MFN right into a higher
right than the original right. I do not see why the multilateralized right
should be stronger than the original right in the MRA agreement.
There is academic discussion, then, about whether MRAs can be closed or
whether they must be open in some way because of MFN rights. Is there an
MFN obligation to recognize? According to what I have just discussed, I
think there is an obligation, and it could be a fairly strong obligation. I am
arguing that it should be seen as a somewhat softer obligation, a possible
fifth approach: an obligation to consult with certain criteria and a burden of
proof that would match the original right. I think that if we have a softer
interpretation, we wind up with something that fits the assumption in the SPS
agreement and the TBT agreement, which is that MRAs are possible. Those
two agreements seem to be talking about the possibility of entering into an
MRA that would be bilateral. It seems to me that it would make sense to
interpret the MFN right in a fairly soft manner to make it fit with those
agreements.
It is possible, then, that there are MFN rights in addition to whatever
rights are in the SPS agreement at the WTO and the TBT agreement at the
WTO. This leads to the question of whether other Members of the WTO
would be able to argue that they are entitled to the benefit of NAFTA rights.
162 id
163 See generally Bartels, supra note 159, at 699.
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If I have just said that some of the NAFTA rights are stronger than the WTO
right, could another Member of the WTO use MFN rights to say, "Okay, we
are entitled to that stronger NAFTA right?" I think that it is not likely to
matter that much concerning SPS rights because those rights are similar an-
yway, although in NAFTA there is an obligation for written reasons (if those
are requested) when the importing country refuses. There is a significant
difference, however, between the WTO TBT right and the much stronger
NAFTA TBT right. Therefore, possibly some other member of the WTO
could demand TBT rights for recognition of its technical regulations using an
MFN obligation.
If we say that there are WTO rights that go beyond the rights outlined in
the SPS agreement and the TBT agreement, then exactly the same arguments
would apply concerning a separate Canada-United States MRA. It would be
precisely the same thing: the WTO Member would be able to demand an
open MRA even if Canada and the United States believed they had negotiat-
ed a closed one.
Next I raise the question of whether there might be similar arguments
within NAFTA. Canada and the United States, for example, negotiate a sep-
arate MRA. What about Mexico? Would Mexico be able to ask for treat-
ment within that MRA? Mexico, at the very least, would have whatever is
available to all Members of the WTO. Within NAFTA, itself, there is a full
MFN clause in the TBT chapter located in NAFTA Article 904(3)(b). 16 As
a result, in fact, Mexico would have those rights as well.
Overall, I am saying that regulatory convergence is demanding. It is hard
to negotiate, and it is hard to coordinate standards. It is hard to organize mu-
tual recognition and update provisions every time a regulation changes.
NAFTA already has significant rights for recognition of equivalence. If we
are thinking of negotiating MRAs beyond that, we need to discuss why the
NAFTA provisions are not sufficient.
Overall, I am suggesting that the possibility of MFN rights need to be
kept in mind.
I thank you for your attention.
DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE REMARKS OF MEERA FICKLING
AND MAUREEN IRISH
MR. LEATHERBERRY: Now we have time for questions from the audi-
ence. Yes?
MR. BLANCHARD: Regarding energy, is there a bill, or are there provi-
sions that would allow Canada and the United States to have a synchronized,
harmonized standard? We are going to need that. Mexico is harder, but the
164 NAFTA, supra note 136, art. 904(3)(b).
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United States and Canada are going to require a similar regime that moves
the ball forward. Is there anything right now that you think does that, or is
that yet to be decided?
MS. FICKLING: There is nothing, to my knowledge, in any of the bills
on the table that deals with United States-Canada coordination.' 6 5 It is simp-
ly not addressed. I guess my answer, then, is that it is still to be determined.
MR. BLANCHARD: I would add one interesting thing. Before President
Obama made his trip to Ottawa,16 6 which was a year ago February and a very
good trip, the Environmental Minister Jim Prentice of Canada'6 7 talked about
coordination witfi Carol Browner.16 8 They at least began talking about it.
I think, though, that Canada is probably waiting to see what the United
States is going to do. Of course, the United States has really slowed the
whole battle down, probably slowed it down until after the election, although
there may be some energy legislation; but it may not be the kind that you
were talking about.
MS. FICKLING: Yes, that is absolutely true. Canada recently declared
in the Copenhagen Plan that they were going to follow United States actions
on climate very closely. The target they submitted to Copenhagen was exact-
ly identical to that of the United States.16 9 In addition, Canada had a clause
that said that their target was subject to whatever the United States decided
on climate.170
It is thus very true that Canada is adopting a wait-and-see approach. Can-
ada wants the United States to pass its legislation before it passes any itself.
Canada is a relatively small economy compared to the United States,17 and
the two economies are heavily integrated. Therefore, it is understandable
165 See generally Canada-U.S. Energy Relations, Gov'T OF CAN.,
http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/washingtonIbilat can/energy-energie.aspx?lang-eng.
(last modified Apr. 14, 2009)
166 See generally, Denis McDonough, Deputy Nat'1 Sec. Advisor for Strategic Commc'n,
Office of the Press Sec., Press Briefing on the Trip of the President to Canada (Feb. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/press-briefing-21709.
167 Jim Prentice, CONSERVATIVE PARTY CAN.,
http://www.conservative.ca/?section id=1051&linkTo-true&districtld=1719 (last visited Jan.
1, 2011).
168 Frances Romero, Energy Czar: Carol Browner, TIME MAG. (Dec. 15, 2008),
http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1866567,00.html (stating that Carol Browner
was head of the Environmental Protection Agency from 1993 to 2001).
169 See Copenhagen Letter, supra note 28.
170 Id.
171 Canada, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/canada/canadaeconomy.html (last updated Jan. 15,
2010) (indicating Canada had estimated GDP of $1.287 trillion for 2009); United States,
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/us.html (last updated Jan, 3, 2007) (indicating the United States had an estimat-
ed GDP of $14.12 trillion for 2009).
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that Canada would take such an approach in order to minimize the impact on
some of its more carbon-intensive industries. I think that is a concern for
Canada.
There also has been a lot of talk within the Joint Public Advisory Com-
mittee of the North American Free Trade Agreement of coordinating some of
these initiatives, but there is nothing embodied in the legislation that allows
for this.172
MR. LEATHERBERRY: Next?
MR. CUNNINGHAM: I am Dick Cunningham from Washington, and I
am a trade lawyer. My question is for Ms. Fickling. You talked about the
international allowances, the import purchasers, and the allowances as a
competitiveness position. What you discussed is very different from the type
of competitiveness measure that we think of traditionally in trade where a
burden is imposed on a domestic industry; and then to level the playing field,
the same burden is imposed on a foreign company. That would mean that,
for example, a United States company has a carbon footprint of ten and a
burden imposed on it of ten, and the same burden would be imposed on a
foreign company. However, as I understand it, that is not what we are doing
at all. We are imposing a burden measured by the foreign company's carbon
footprint, which, in the case of China, might be, for example, fifty. I have
seen studies saying that that would impose huge burdens on Chinese imports.
I will not get us into the mind-numbing complexities of Article 20 justifi-
cations and exceptions, 173 but it seems to me that the practice of one country
imposing a disproportionate burden on another country compared to that
which it imposes on its own domestic industries is not only unfair according
to the World Trade Organization,17 4 but would lead to, in the words of that
great trade lawyer, Saddam Hussein, "the mother of all trade wars." 7 5
MS. FICKLING: The details of how this program is mainstreamed are
not in the legislation.176 They are to be determined pretty far in the future.
Exactly how this measure is going to be imposed, whether it is going to
be done based on United States carbon intensity, foreign carbon intensity, or
in accordance with World Trade Organization (WTO) jurisprudence, is un-
clear. In the Shrimp Turtle case, the court said that foreign firms need to be
able to appeal their treatment under the border allowance provision if, for
172 See generally COMM'N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, JOINT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE
(JPAC) ACTIVITY REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION (CEC) SINCE JUNE 2007, available at
http://www.cec.org/Storage/24/1546 Sincejune_2007.pdf (table referencing several JPAC
activities focused on fostering cooperation among the NAFTA countries).
17n GATT, supra note 155, at 262.
174 Id. at 198.
17 See STEvE A. YETIv, THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS 177 (1997).
176 See GATT, supra note 155.
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example, their firm produces their widgets in a "green" manner. 17 7 There are
definitely WTO issues with the border allowance provision.
Things would be a lot easier if we simply had a carbon tax and could just
do a border tax adjustment (BTA) on foreign products, but that is not the
approach we are talking about. The International Reserve Allowance Pro-
gram, 7 8 with the way the legislation is written, is trying to be a de facto
BTA, but I think it would be treated somewhat differently under WTO rules.
MR. CUNNINGHAM: Is that really what we are trying to do? Or are we
trying to put pressure on China to adopt a climate change regime that would
achieve reductions similar to our reductions? Based on where this is headed,
that seems to be an anthem of the trading system.
MS. FICKLING: That is one of the standard goals of the legislation: to
act as a stick against China. I do not think it is going to be particularly effec-
tive.
The industries that this border allowance provision applies to are a pretty
narrow set of industries.'79 These are not industries in which United States
exports to China and India comprise a large portion of overall work produc-
tion. By all of our estimates at the Peterson Institute, it is not going to be a
very effective stick, but that is one of the goals of the legislation. The way it
is written to apply in practice is to impose costs that the firm would have to
pay if it produced in the United States.'80
1 See, Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shirmp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998); see also Panel Report, United States -
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shirmp Products, WTIDS58/R (May 15, 1998).
178 AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, H.R. REP. No. 111-137, pt.1, at
229 (2009).
17 See Elizabeth M. Lynch, The U.S. Climate Change Bill: International Trade Implica-
tions & China, HUFFINGTON PosT (Sept. 7, 2009, 12:24 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elizabeth-lynch/the-us-climate-change-bil b 278750.html
(stating regulations will not impact China significantly because the impacted industries repre-
sent only a small portion of Chinese imports to the United States and an even smaller portion
of the Chinese economy, in addition to listing the five industries covered by the new climate
bill: "steel, aluminum, chemicals, paper, and cement"); see also H.R. REP. No. 111-137, at 231
(limiting the International Reserve Allowance Program to industries producing "primary prod-
ucts").
Iso See H.R. REP. No. 111-137, at 230 ("The Administrator shall establish the program
under paragraph (1) in a manner that addresses, consistent with international agreements to
which the United States is a party, the competitive imbalance in the costs of producing or
manufacturing primary products in industrial sectors resulting from the difference between -
(A) the direct and indirect costs of complying with this title; and (B) the direct and indirect
costs, if any, of complying in other countries with greenhouse gas regulatory programs, re-
quirements, export tariffs, or other measures adopted or imposed to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.").
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Actually, for the first few years of the border allowance program, the re-
bates are scheduled to start phasing out in 2025.8"' They will be phased out
by 2035.182 Accordingly, from 2020 until 2027 to approximately 2028, the
International Reserve might not even end up having to buy any allowances at
the border because, within the United States, one hundred percent of industry
average compliance costs are supposed to be compensated for; that must be
taken into account under the current United States legislation.' 83
My sense is that the legislation, as written, is narrowly focused, and it will
not start having large effects until much later in the future. Again, the devil
is in the details as to how this is going to be administrated. The Environmen-
tal Protection Agency administrator and the Executive Branch will have sig-
nificant latitude when applying this law.
MR. CARMODY: Chi Carmody from The University of Western Ontar-
io 184
First of all, on the issue of using the Commission for Environmental Co-
operation (CEC)185 as a clearing house to adopt uniform or standardized defi-
nitions for some of these issues regarding the environmental atmosphere,
does the CEC have the power to do that? Is it actually given that capacity in
its treaty?
MS. FICKLING: The Commission for Environmental Cooperation
(CEC) really does not have much power at all.
The CEC serves as a forum to talk about these issues and as a research
arm of the North American Free Trade Agreement with regard to the envi-
ronment.186 They publish a number of reports every year.
They could do more with the regulation issues, highlighting what is on the
table in the United States and Canada and what the sources of greenhouse
gases are in each of the three countries. This is information that the CEC is
very much in a position to disseminate, and it could be adopting a much
broader role in doing so.
181 Id. 227-28.
182 Id. 228.
183 Cf Clean Energy Act, supra note 178 (While the rebates discussed in section 765 begin
phasing out in 2026, section 766 specifies that the International Reserve Allowance Program
cannot start before Jan. 1, 2025 so there will be no International Reserve Allowance Program
from 2020-2025).
184 Chi Carmody, THE U. W. ONT.,
https://www.law.uwo.ca/lawsys/pages/contents.asp?contentName=Instructors&contentFileNa
me=ccarmody (last visited Nov. 21, 2010).
185 About the Commission: About the CEC, COMMISSION FOR ENvTL. COOPERATION,
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PagelD= 1 226&SiteNodelD=31 0&BLExpandlD=154 (last
visted Oct. 3, 2010).
186 Id
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31
Leatherberry et al.: Economic Impact of Canada-United States Regulatory Convergence: F
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2011
CANADA-UNITED STATES LA WJOURNAL
In terms of requiring these jurisdictions to harmonize their environmental
provisions, the CEC really does not have any power to enforce or mandate
that,'" but it could serve as a forum if countries, themselves, wish to do so.
MR. CARMODY: Maureen, do you think that the issue of most favored
nation treatment is something that complicates the conclusion of mutual
recognition agreements (MRAs) and, therefore, to some extent explains why
we have not had more advances in this area? Countries have not been will-
ing to rush into MRAs because they are worried that some third country
could say it needs the same treatment because it is part of the same treaty
law.
MS. RUSH: I suppose the question is whether people are actually wor-
ried about most favored nation (MFN) rights at all.
I do not know that a great deal of the discussion about regulatory conver-
gence has actually highlighted this issue, and it is one that concerns me. I am
not sure that, for example, a slow development of mutual recognition agree-
ments could, in fact, be attributed to concerns about this.
If it turns out that, in fact, there are MFN demands, then certainly they
could be fairly onerous. Imagine having to give written reasons for every
refusal to recognize. It could be very onerous.
I do have to say that I do not think this is an issue that has been much dis-
cussed, except in the Journal of International Economic Law,' which, of
course, we all read regularly. Outside a fairly specialized field, though, I am
not sure that it is much discussed.
I think mutual recognition, in fact, is difficult to organize because you
must have some provision for continual updating. Standards change. Gov-
ernments regulate. It is difficult to coordinate.
MR. FUNG: David Fung here.
First of all, I am not a lawyer, nor would I really want to be one. I do not
know how you are going to deal with these issues because we as business
people run way ahead of what these regulations are doing.
Take the iPad: inside there are probably twenty to forty countries' com-
ponents.'89 What are the regulations for each one of those components?
How do you define whether that is really a product of China if only the labor
components are made in China; only $12 of the $500 is from China.
187 Id. (listing one goal of the CEC: to "promote the effective enforcement of environmental
law," which indicates it does not enforce environmental law itself).
188 See, e.g., Irish, supra note 138.
8 Hal R. Varian, An iPod Has Global Value. Ask the (Many) Countries That Make It.,
N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/28/business/worldbusiness/28scene.html (discussing how
iPod has approximately 450 components coming from a wide variety of countries, which are
often difficult to identify because Apple does not identify all manufacturers of components
used in its products).
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How do we define the product? What are the regimes that one would use
to define that product?
MS. IRISH: Certainly, I think there is a great deal of standardization that
simply has developed through market forces. Some of it would be through
recognized international standardizing organizations, and some of it is simply
through the operation of market forces.
If that is the case, is there really a need for governmental mutual recogni-
tion agreements? I suppose that is the issue.
MR. FUNG: Thank you. Our legislatures and our politicians are also
falling behind. You mentioned the issue of trading hydropower in the Cana-
dian border provinces with the thermal power from the coal-fire power plants
on the United States side. The legislation tried to prevent that kind of bilat-
eral trade. That is the most harm we can do to the environment. Our legisla-
tures understand that if Canada does not import electrical power from those
coal-fire power plants in the United States at night during the low demand
period, some of those power plants may have to shut down frequently, which
would cause enormous damage to the equipment of the power plants.
If the Canadian hydropower would stop producing at night and not be
able to retain the water to generate the additional electrical power for export
during the day, then the United States would have to use energy from coal-
fire power plants to meet demand during the day. We should, therefore, en-
courage that kind of transfer rather than trying to discourage it. By putting in
regulations to discourage this kind of bilateral trade, thinking that we are
trying to be green, we are actually going to cause a lot more carbon emission
in the process.
MS. FICKLING: Let me clarify. It is not that the border states are dis-
barring hydropower from being imported at all or even trying to limit the
imports of hydropower from Canada. That is not what they are trying to do.
The Renewable Portfolio legislation mandates that the state must produce a
certain percentage of their electricity from renewable energy.190 In that par-
ticular legislation, there are certain types of electricity that will count as be-
ing renewable, and each state specifies what those types of electricity are.191
If a state is currently importing a large amount of hydropower from Cana-
da, the Renewable Portfolio legislation is not intended to stop that at all. Its
intention is to create new renewable generation. 192 Therefore, if it is eco-
"90 States With Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY (May 2009),
httl://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewableportfolio-states.cfm.
I See generally EDWARD A. HOLT, CLEAN ENERGY STATES ALLIANCE, INCREASING
HARMONIZATION AMONG STATE RPS PROGRAMS 8 (2008), available at
http://www.cleanenergystates.org/JointProjects/RPS/Holt CESARPSHarmonization-d2_08
0819.pdf (discussing the various market barriers that exist due to the fragmented nature of
RPS programs).
192 See Renewable Portfolio Standards Fact Sheet, U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
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nomical for the state to import a lot of hydropower from Canada, it is not
intended to stop that at all.
Different states treat that differently; some states count large Canadian
hydropower as renewable electricity.' 93 Some wish to keep the definition of
renewable electricity limited to certain kinds of electricity, such as solar and
wind, and to scale up additional sources to be used in the future. 194
This is just a long-winded way of saying that it is not a barrier to hydro-
power being imported to the United States at the status quo level. It might
not necessarily encourage additional imports, but it is really not the same as
saying that the state is disallowing hydropower from being imported.
I thought you brought up a really good point in regard to products being
comprised differently. Many parts are shipped off to their final destination
without regard to emissions.
Getting back to your question about how this is going to be applied and
whether it is going to be applied at the foreign emissions level or the United
States emissions level, calculating the emissions that go into a particular
product for import that has been constructed in twelve different countries
would be an administrative nightmare.
My guess is that they would probably calculate the emissions intensity of
a certain product at the United States emissions level, mainly to avoid the
administrative nightmare that would result if it were calculated in some other
manner. It would appear to make more sense to regulate at the domestic
emissions intensity.
MR. LEATHERBERRY: One more question, and then we will have to
take a break.
MR. HIBBITTS: Bernard Hibbitts, Canadian professor at the University
of Pittsburgh School of Law.1 95
Maureen, at the beginning of your presentation, you said that regulatory
convergence is hard to accomplish without convergence of governments. I
am pretty sure I know what you mean, but I would love to have you elaborate
on that.
MS. IRISH: It seems to me that it is easier to have a principle, such as the
Cassis de Dijon principle in the European Community, where there is an
overall governmental structure at the Community level to accomplish agreed
upon European Community regulations. There are systems there for deci-
htt,://www.epa.gov/chp/state-policy/renewable fs.html (last updated Oct. 7, 2010).
Id.
194 Id. (providing a table showing that almost every state's RPS program makes biomass,
biofuels, hydro, landfill gas, photovalics, solar thermal electric, and wind eligible technologies
while inclusion of numerous other technologies varies widely among the participating states).
'9 BernardJ. Hibbits, U. PITTSBURGH, http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/ (last visited Nov.
21, 2010).
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sion-making. Between sovereign independent countries, however, we simply
do not have that.
It seems to me that it becomes difficult to talk about mutual recognition
agreements, or regulatory convergence, unless you have some centralizing
institutional law outlined. If there is a centralizing institution, then obviously
you look to that, the power within the institutions and how things actually
operate.
Governments regulate in an ongoing way. That is what they are supposed
to do. If we assume that there is going to be convergence, then do we need
other levels to coordinate? I am not saying that it is impossible for govern-
ments to cooperate. But if we are expecting things will be very coordinated,
as within the European Union, then we need a structure that is very present. I
do not think that sovereign independent nations really expect that, nor do
members of the public. Thus it seems to me that regulatory convergence is,
in some ways, very challenging.
MR. LEATHERBERRY: Thank you to our panelists.
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